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ABSTRACT 
Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menelaah determinan struktur modal perusahaan di 
Indonesia. Sampel yang diambil adalah 87 perusahaan yang terdaftar di BEJ. Model panel 
data digunakan sebagai metoda dalam menganalisis determinan struktur modal. Dari hasil 
regresi diketahui bahwa variabel tangibility, growth opportunity, size, dan profitability 
mempunyai pengaruh terhadap struktur modal perusahaan. 
Keywords: Capital Structure, Determinant, Indonesia, Panel Data.  
 
INTRODUCTION
*
 
Many believe that one of the important 
factors of monetary crisis in Indonesia is debt 
burden. A huge capital inflow not only makes 
Indonesian economy grow, but also results in 
economic overheating. Indonesian firms’ faced 
an increasing amount of external debt and the 
shorter maturity of their debt. These make 
them fragile to sentiments and boost financial 
distress risk (World Bank, 1998). 
The increasing of Indonesian firm’s 
external debt is caused by several factors. A 
significant difference between domestic and 
international interest rate and predictability of 
exchange rate are perceived as attractive 
reasons to borrow abroad with improper 
hedging policy before crisis period (World 
Bank, 1998).  
Macro economic factors, such as interest 
rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, the liquidity 
level of the economy, the government policy 
that benefited certain sector, capital market 
development, and other institutional factors are 
                                                 
*
  This paper is a revisited version of my thesis “Studi 
empiris mengenai struktur modal perusahaan di 
Indonesia: analisis panel data”. I would like to thanks 
to Mr. Ruslan Prijadi for all his advises. 
thought to have significant influence to firms’ 
capital structure choice. For example, there is a 
jump of percentage change in external debt-to-
GDP ratio from 64% in 1997 become 150% at 
the end of 1998. This movement could be 
indication of changes in Indonesian firms’ 
capital structure that due to exchange rate 
swing. 
Ideally, such factors are included as 
independent variables in studying the capital 
structure decision. Such study needs both 
country level and firm level data. 
Unfortunately, we do not have firm level data 
from the other countries. Those macrolevel 
factors are not included directly to the research 
design, rather controlled by included dummy 
time variable and its interactions with firm 
specific capital structure determinants. By 
doing this, the real effect of firm specific factor 
at microlevel on capital structure choice can be 
ensured.  
There are several empirical researches 
about the determinants of capital structure of 
Indonesian firms, such as Fatemi, Ang and 
Tourani-Rad [1997], Purba [2001], and 
Tahirman [2000]. They used cross-sectional 
regression method in estimating determinants 
of capital structure which could not control for 
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both firm-variant heterogeneity and time-
variant heterogeneity. This study tries to fill 
this gap by using panel data in analysis of 
capital structure determinants.  
This study uses an Indonesian data set to 
assess whether capital structure theory is 
portable across firms with different industrial 
characteristics, and to find out why some firms 
use more debt than others under identical 
macro conditions of taxation and interest rates. 
The lack of convincing and conclusive eviden-
ce was probably what prompted Miler [1977] 
to put forth his famous irrelevancy theory. 
Miller’s irrelevance holds that an optimal 
capital structure exists only for the aggregate 
economy. Theories of optimal capital structure 
survive not because they do any good but 
because they do not harm. There are at least 
two implications of this theory. First, the 
aggregate amount of debt used by corporations 
should be correlated with the appropriate 
macro variables such as tax rates, interest rates, 
financial institutions type, and second, the 
distribution of the firm debt ratios around this 
aggregate should be random.  
However, inter-industry differences of debt 
ratios or leverage ratios and their correlation 
with firm characteristics provide evidence 
against such a random distribution (Titman and 
Wessels [1988]; Balakrishnan and Fox [1993]; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic [1994]; 
Rajan and Zingales [1995]; Hussain and 
Nivorozhkin [1997]; Booth, Aivazian, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic [2000]; 
Purba [2001]; Bevan and Danbold [2001]). 
Important theories of capital structure that 
attempt to explain these differences have 
included additional variables, such as; agency 
cost (Jensen and Meckling [1976]), non-debt 
tax shields (DeAngelo and Masulis [1980]), 
under-investment cost, assets substitution, and 
over-investment cost due to shareholder-
bondholder conflict (Myers [1977]), asym-
metry information problems between insider 
and outsider (Ross [1977], Leland and Pyle 
[1977], Myers and Najluf [1984]), pecking 
order hypothesis and combination of these 
variables. 
Three-research questions are proposed. 
First, do the firm-specific factors (such as 
tangibility, growth opportunity, size of the 
firm, and profitability) influence the firm 
capital structure? Second, do their influences 
have significant differences between crisis 
period and before crisis period? Third, does 
industrial classification have significant impact 
on firms’ leverage?  
The remaining sections of this study are 
organized as follow. Section 2 presents an 
overview of literature on capital structure. 
Section 3 describes data and research 
methodology. Section 4 reports results of the 
statistical analyses. Section 5 summarizes the 
main consideration of the study. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are several definitions of capital 
structure or leverage. The definition of 
leverage depends on the objective of analyses 
(Rajan and Zingales [1995]). For example, for 
agency problems related studies of capital 
structure, leverage may be defined as debt-to-
firm value ratio, debt-to-total assets ratio, total 
liabilities-to-total assets, or total debt-to-net 
assets. For study of leverage and financial 
distress, interest coverage ratio is more 
suitable. Further, debt measures could be 
divided into its various components and 
numerator and denominator could be measured 
in book value and market value terms.  
Prior research for capital structure 
determinants has indicated that both the level 
of total leverage and the determinants of 
leverage (RZ [1995]) vary significantly 
depending on the definition of leverage 
adopted. In this paper, therefore the analyses 
are based on two components of debt, rather 
than on more aggregate leverage measure (i.e. 
total leverage). Debt is decomposed into three 
categories: total debt (or total leverage), long-
term debt, and short-term debt. Both book 
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value and market value is used in measure the 
level of total leverage, long-term debt, and 
short-term debt.  
There are at least three main theories 
considered as theoretical model of capital 
structure, i.e. static trade-off theory (STO), 
agency theory model (ATM), and pecking 
order theory (POH). In STO, capital structure 
move toward certain target that convey the 
type of firm assets, profitability, business risk, 
tax rate, and bankruptcy risk. In ATM, the 
potential conflict among manger, shareholders, 
and bondholders determine optimal capital 
structure minimized agency costs. Asset 
characteristics, and firm growth opportunities 
are important factors in agency cost. While in 
POH, market imperfection becomes the main 
issue. Transaction cost and asymmetric 
information try to link between firm ability to 
start a new investment and internal funds. If 
they should explore external sources, they 
more likely to issue debt then equity because 
of lower asymmetric information in debt than 
in equity issue. 
The selection of independent variables as 
the determinants of leverage is primarily 
guided by the result from previous empirical 
studies in some developed and developing 
countries. According to prior research, several 
variables explain variations in leverage. 
Titman and Wessel (1988) used assets struc-
ture, firm growth, non-debt tax shields, and 
firm uniqueness as explanatory variables of 
leverage level. Harris and Raviv (1991) 
suggest that leverage will increase as fixed 
assets, non-debt tax shield, investment 
opportunities, and size of firm increase; and 
will decrease as profitability, R&D expend-
iture, advertising expenditure, bankruptcy 
probability, product uniqueness increase. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that debt to 
total asset ratio is positively correlated with 
tangibility and size of firm; and negatively 
correlated with growth opportunity and 
profitability. This study used these four Rajan 
and Zingales variables as independent 
variables or the determinant of capital structure 
and discuss below the theoretical and empirical 
considerations underlying each one of them. 
Tangibility: According to Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), tangibility is the important 
variable in firm financing decision, because 
tangible assets act as collateral and provide 
security to lenders in the event of financial 
distress. Typically, intangible assets contain 
more asymmetric information about the value 
than tangible assets; it is easier for the lender 
to establish the value of tangible than 
intangible assets. Moreover, it is highly likely 
that in the face of probable bankruptcy, 
intangible assets like goodwill will rapidly 
disappear, thus diminishing the net worth of a 
firm and further accelerating its bankruptcy 
probability. Hence, one could argue that firms 
with a greater percentage of their total assets 
composed of tangible assets will have a higher 
capacity for raising debt. Collaterals also 
protect lenders from moral hazard problem 
cause by the shareholders-lenders conflict 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, firms with 
higher tangible assets are expected to have 
high level of debt. 
Some empirical studies report a statistically 
significant relationship between tangibility and 
total debt-to-total assets ratio (Titman and 
Wessels [1988]; Rajan and Zingales [1995]; 
Booth, Aivazian, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic [2000]; Purba [2001]). While, 
Bevan and Danbold [2001] suggest that the 
relationship between tangibility and leverage 
depends on the definition of leverage adopted. 
They found positive correlation between 
tangibility and long-term debt elements; a 
negative correlation is observed for short-term 
debt elements. Other study (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic [1994]) found that tangibility 
has positive correlation on total debt and long-
term debt, but negative correlation on short-
term debt. 
Growth opportunity. Myers [1977] argues 
that the potential for under investment and 
resources diversion is most severe for 
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companies whose value is predominately 
accounted for by future investment 
opportunities. Future investment opportunities 
represent a firm’s intangible value that does 
not have collateral value and would like to be 
losing value if financial distress takes place. 
Rajan and Zingales [1995] suggest that due to 
under investment problems (Myers and Majluf 
[1984]), it is expected a negative relationship 
between expected growth and leverage. These 
suggest a negative relationship between growth 
opportunity and leverage ratio. Titman and 
Wessels [1988] also suggest a similar 
relationship but for the reason that firms with 
greater growth opportunity have more 
flexibility to invest sub optimally and thus 
expropriate wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders. Rajan and Zingales point out that 
timing could be the other reason of negative 
relationship between growth opportunity and 
leverage ratio. If this is true, this negative 
relationship should be driven by companies 
that issued equity in a big size (Rajan and 
Zingales [1995]). Equity holders in highly 
leveraged companies with significant growth 
opportunity have incentives to do sub optimal 
investment policy (Myers [1977]). If these 
agency cost is severe, then it could be 
predicted that the growth companies would 
mainly be financed with equity or short-term 
debt. These implied that agency problem might 
be lower for short–term debt than long-term 
debt. As assets that revealed in balance sheets 
did not capture the future investment 
opportunities rather than share price reflects 
them. Therefore, market-to-book ratio is used 
as proxy for growth opportunity.  
Empirical evidence on relationship between 
growth opportunity and leverage is incon-
clusive. The studies conducted by Rajan and 
Zingales [1995], Titman and Wessels [1988] 
confirm negative relation between growth 
opportunity and total debt. Booth et al. [2000] 
find negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and long-term debt (both in book 
value and market value). While, Bevan and 
Danbold [2001] found; positive insignificant 
relation between growth opportunity and long-
term debt; and negative significant relation bet-
ween growth opportunity and short-term debt.  
Size. Size can be expected to be a proxy of 
firms’ default probability (Titman and Wessels 
[1988]). As (1) bankruptcy costs are fixed and 
a diminishing function of firm value (Titman 
and Wessels [1988]) and (2) larger companies 
are usually more diversified and so less 
probability to bankrupt than smaller compa-
nies, then it suggest that larger firm size should 
lead to higher debt capacity. Therefore, it can 
be predicted that size has positive relationship 
with leverage especially for countries and 
industries with higher bankruptcy cost. 
Usually, asymmetric information between 
insider and market is less severe in larger 
companies; therefore, they should have higher 
capability to issue information sensitive 
securities (like equity) and have lower debt 
level than smaller companies (Rajan and 
Zingales [1995], Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic [1996]). The asymmetric 
information problems could make the negative 
relation between size and leverage. 
Size is predicted to have positive relation-
ship with long-term debt. Larger companies 
have easy access to get long-term debt than 
smaller companies (Rajan and Zingales [1995], 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic [1996]). 
Agency conflicts between lenders and 
stockholders are probably more intense in 
small companies. Lender could manage the 
risk of borrowed funds to small companies by 
restraint the maturity of debt (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic [1996]). Consequently, 
smaller companies are expected to have less 
long-term debt –but probably have more short-
term debt– than larger companies (Titman and 
Wessels [1988]). 
Generally, empirical evidences confirm the 
positive relationship between size and total 
debt-to-total asset ratio (Titman and Wessels 
[1988], Rajan and Zingales [1995], Bevan and 
Danbold [2001]). Purba [2000] found this 
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positive relationship only for the export-
oriented firms. There are also evidences that 
larger firms tend to use more long-term debt, 
trade credit, short-term securitised debt, but 
less short-term bank financing than small firms 
(Danbold and Bevan [2001]). 
 Profitability. Modigliani and Miller had 
made the interest tax-shield explanations; firms 
with high profits would employ high debt to 
gain tax benefits. Further, in the presence of 
asymmetric information profitable firms may 
signal quality by leveraging up (Jensen, 1986). 
If these are true, then there will be a positive 
relationship between leverage and profitability. 
Contrary, the pecking order or asymmetric 
information hypothesis of Myers and Majluf 
[1984] postulates that companies prefer 
internal financing to debt or equity. The 
interest tax-shield may also not work for those 
firms that have other avenues, like 
depreciation, to shield their taxes (DeAngelo 
and Masulis [1980]). Firms with higher 
profitability will employ higher retained 
earning and less debt. Most empirical studies 
confirm the pecking order hypothesis (Titman 
and Wessels [1988], Baskin [1989], Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic [1994], Rajan and 
Zingales [1995], Purba [2000], Bevan and 
Danbold [2001], Booth et.al. [2001]).  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study use data of ICMD published by 
ECFIN.1 The selected time-period from 1989 
to 1999 is intended to capture the differences 
in economic conditions of Indonesian economy 
(before and after crisis) and data availability 
consideration. Companies that exist throughout 
the 10-year period with no missing data are 
included in the study. Firms are grouped into 
nine industrial sectors. These groups are based 
on JSX classification. Firms in the financial, 
securities, and investment sector were 
excluded from sample. The sector that contains 
                                                 
1  Authors express the gratitude to Wawan Kurniawan, 
ECFIN Journal, for making data available. 
only one firm in sample (mining industry) is 
also excluded. The remaining industry sectors 
are as follow: 
1. S1:  agriculture industry. 
2. S2:  basic industry and chemical industry. 
3. S3:  miscellaneous industry. 
4. S4:  consumer goods industry. 
5. S5:  real estate and property industry. 
6. S6: infrastructure, utilities, and transpor-
tation industry. 
7. S7: trade and services industry (not inclu-
ding investment companies). 
The remaining firms after eliminating outlier 
are 87 for each year.  
The entire period from 1989 to 1999 is 
divided into two sub periods: before crisis 
period (1989-1996) and crisis period (1997-
1999). The variables are calculated as follow: 
Dependent variables measure leverage level 
are: 
1. Total leverage in book values. LEV1B = 
[total debt / total assets]. 
2. Total leverage in market values. LEV1M = 
[total debt / (total assets – book value of 
equity + market value of equity)]. 
3. Long-term debt ratio in book values. LTDB 
= [total long-term debt / total assets]. 
4. Long-term debt ratio in market values. 
LTDM = [total long-term debt / (total assets 
- book value of equity + market value of 
equity)]. 
5. Short-term debt ratio in book values. STDB 
= [total short-term debt / total assets]. 
6. Short-term debt ratio in market values. 
STDM = [total short-term debt / (total 
assets - book value of equity + market value 
of equity)]. 
Independent variables: 
1. Tangibility. TAN = [net depreciable fixed 
assets / total assets]. We hypothesized that 
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tangibility is positively related to all 
leverage measures. 
2. Growth opportunity. MTB = [(total assets – 
book value of equity + market value of 
equity)/total assets]. We hypothesized 
empirically that growth opportunity has 
negative relationship with total leverage 
and long-term debt ratios, but positively 
related to short-term debt ratios. 
3. Size. SIZEA = [log (sales)]. We hypothe-
sized size has a positive relation with total 
leverage ratio and long-term debt ratios, 
and short-term debt ratios.  
4. Profitability. PROA = [EBIT/total assets]. 
We hypothesized profitability is negatively 
related to each leverage measures. 
5. Industrial dummies. In order to control for 
any industry-specific effects that may not 
be captured by the variables above, industry 
dummies are also included as independent 
variable. 
6. Time dummy. DUMTHA = {zero if before 
crisis period; and one if crisis period}. 
 
This study assumes that the differences in 
debt ratios could result from a firm’s dynamic 
through different times. Let the capital 
structure or leverage, Lit, for firm i at period t, 
Lit = F (Xit, Di, Dt)  (1)   
be a function of a vector of firm and time 
variant variables determining capital structure 
(Xit), and Di and Dt. Di and Dt are firm-specific 
and time-specific effects represented by firm 
and time dummy (or time trend) variables 
respectively. To conserve degrees of freedom 
the firm-specific effects (Di) are replaced by 
industrial sector dummy variables. Thus, the 
leverage is allowed to vary across firms and 
over time. Since factors that determine a firm’s 
leverage may change over time, it is likely that 
the optimal debt ratio may move over time 
even for the same firm. This captures the 
dynamic nature of the capital structure pro-
blem, which has hitherto been overlooked in 
the literature. By taking averages over time, 
most papers employing time series do not ma-
ke use of this important source of information. 
Since there is cross-sectional heterogeneity, 
the GLS estimations rather than OLS 
estimations is used in this study. By using first 
order autoregressive in the model, first-order 
positive serial correlation can be removed in 
the GLS model. After looking at table 2, the 
matrix of correlation coefficients between the 
dependent and independent variables, we find 
that most cross-correlation terms are fairly 
small, thus giving no cause for concern about 
problem of multicollinearity among variables.  
Four steps are used in the estimation 
process. First, pooled GLS regressions are 
estimated. Pooled GLS model might produce 
biased result due to its failure to control for 
time-invariant firm-specific heterogeneity. The 
pooled GLS model analysis yields results that 
are generally consistent with other cross-
sectional results. Based on Hausman test, fixed 
effect GLS models are used in the second step 
to counter for time-invariant firm-specific 
heterogeneity. Third, fixed effect GLS models 
are extended by incorporating time dummy and 
its interactions with each independent 
variables. This analysis of the dynamics in the 
panel is intended to control both firm variant 
and time variant heterogeneity. This process 
could capture the dynamic on all variables 
influence capital structure. Therefore, this 
study let not only intercept but also slope vary 
in the regression. Fourth, the pooled GLS 
regressions with industrial dummy are made to 
conserve degrees of freedom of the firm-
specific effects (Di) in fixed effect GLS 
models. Therefore, we could see the industry 
classification effect on leverage. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 1 provides means of each leverage 
measures for 1989-1999 periods. On the 
average, the JSX companies employ relatively 
high level of total debt. The total debt ratio is 
around 53.22% in book value or 53.83% in 
market value for entire 10-years period. The 
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short-term debt ratio is twice of the long-term 
debt ratio. The distribution of ratios is skewed 
toward lower end, except for total debt in 
market value. The average market value ratios 
are higher then the book value ratios. These 
results support the World Bank report that 
Indonesian firms face not only an increasing 
amount of external debt but also the shorter 
maturity of their debt. 
Each debt ratios in table 1 show substantial 
change during before crisis period (1990-1996) 
and crisis period (1997-1999). During the 
crisis period, the Indonesian economy suffered 
a drop in exchange rate where the USD soared 
and the market price of shares fell. Unfortu-
nately, their debt was mostly USD nominated 
and part of them was short-term debt. 
Table 2 provides correlation matrix for the 
pooled sample of 870 observations. Growth 
opportunity and profitability are positively 
correlated with size of the firm. This implies 
that larger firms tend to grow fast and have 
higher profitability. Tangibility has a negative 
correlation with profitability and growth 
opportunity. 
Tangibility has a positive correlation with 
total leverage ratio and long-term debt ratio, 
but negative correlation with short-term debt 
ratio. Growth opportunity is significantly and 
negatively correlated with all market leverage 
ratio (LEV1M, LTDM, and STDM). It does 
not have significant correlation with book 
leverage ratio, except for STDB. Size is 
positively correlated with all leverage ratios. 
This study also observed that profitability has 
negative association with all leverage 
measures. Finally, this study does observe that 
book leverage ratios are highly correlated with 
market leverage ratios. 
Table 3 presents regression results. We first 
discuss result of pooled GLS regression. Then 
second, we continue to discuss result of fixed 
effect GLS model. Afterward, we will explain 
the finding of fixed effect GLS regression with 
time dummy variable and time dummy 
interaction variables. 
Pooled GLS Estimation Result 
Table 3 panel A presents the result of the 
pooled GLS regression analysis. At the 
aggregate level, we find that the regressions 
are statistically significant, and we are able to 
reject the null hypothesis of joint significance 
of the coefficients at less than the one percent 
level. Although, the adjusted R
2 
measure 
differs significantly among them, from a low 
of 48.31% for market value of long-term debt 
ratio (LTDM), to a high 92.63% for book 
value of total leverage ratio (LEV1B). 
Tangibility: This study finds a statistically 
significant positive relationship between tangi-
bility and all types of book and market value 
leverage ratios. This finding supports collateral 
value explanation. This suggests that tangible 
asset could be collateral and reduce agency 
conflict between bondholders or lenders and 
shareholders. This result also suggests that 
firm with more tangible assets tend to borrow 
more than firm with less tangible assets 
Growth opportunity: The multivariate-
pooled OLS regression results show that the 
coefficient of MTB (as a proxy of growth 
opportunity variable) is negative significant 
throughout, except for STDB. This study finds 
a significantly positive relationship between 
MTB and STDB. These confirm the pecking 
order theory of Myers [1977] that suggest that 
companies with high market-to-book ratio 
would have lower long-term debt ratios and 
leverage ratios, and used more equity or short-
term debt due to the under-investment 
problem.  
Size: Except for LTDB, This study finds 
that size of the firm has significant positive 
influence to all type of book and market 
leverage ratios. The positive influence of size 
to leverage ratios confirms the hypothesis that 
larger firms tend to be more diversified and 
less prone to bankruptcy and the direct cost of 
issuing debt or equity is smaller. This is 
consistent with the trade-off theory. 
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Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Std Dev Median Skewness Min Max 
Dependent variables (N=87, T=10, NT=870) 
LEV1B 
LEV1M 
LTDB 
LTDM 
STDB 
STDM 
Total leverage ratio (book) 
Total leverage ratio (market) 
Long–term debt ratio (book) 
Long–term debt ratio (market) 
Short–term debt ratio (book) 
Short–term debt ratio (market) 
0.5322 
0.5383 
0.1482 
0.1537 
0.3782 
0.3796 
0.2497 
0.2678 
0.1708 
0.1811 
0.2457 
0.2522 
0.5317 
0.5513 
0.0737 
0.0801 
0.3341 
0.3200 
0.6228 
0.0824 
1.2408 
1.3054 
1.3928 
0.6885 
0.0165 
0.0308 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0165 
0.0122 
1.7526 
1.5738 
0.9091 
0.8579 
1.7450 
1.2088 
Independent variables (N=87, T=10, NT=870) 
TAN 
MTB 
SIZEA 
PROA 
Tangibility 
Growth opportunity  
Size of firm (log sales) 
Profitability 
0.3669 
1.1568 
5.1524 
0.1058 
0.2046 
0.6718 
0.6692 
0.0961 
0.3390 
0.9821 
5.0496 
0.0860 
0.4752 
2.9082 
0.4058 
1.0586 
0.0013 
0.0705 
1.9085 
-0.3426 
0.9552 
6.5870 
7.2006 
0.5953 
The mean (standard deviation) leverage ratio from 1990-1999. 
Year LEV1B LEV1M LTDB LTDM   STDB STDM N 
1990 
 
0.3950 
(0.1593) 
0.4199 
(0.1950) 
0.0945 
(0.1305) 
0.1067 
(0.1486) 
0.2941 
(0.1634) 
0.3052 
(0.1867) 
87 
 
1991 
 
0.4044 
(0.1758) 
0.4544 
(0.2304) 
0.1129 
(0.1302) 
0.1209 
(0.1345) 
0.2904 
(0.1634) 
0.3267 
(0.2183) 
87 
 
1992 
 
0.4371 
(0.1698) 
0.4788 
(0.2309) 
0.1244 
(0.1414) 
0.1331 
(0.1467) 
0.3132 
(0.1561) 
0.3454 
(0.2121) 
87 
 
1993 
 
0.4626 
(0.1730) 
0.4034 
(0.2490) 
0.1349 
(0.1529) 
0.1242 
(0.1532) 
0.3192 
(0.1625) 
0.2798 
(0.2175) 
87 
 
1994 
 
0.4771 
(0.1943) 
0.4852 
(0.2574) 
0.1295 
(0.1461) 
0.1354 
(0.1607) 
0.3404 
(0.1799) 
0.3474 
(0.2272) 
87 
 
1995 
 
0.5178 
(0.2087) 
0.5612 
(0.2849) 
0.1435 
(0.1546) 
0.1627 
(0.1845) 
0.3526 
(0.1851) 
0.3860 
(0.2451) 
87 
 
1996 
 
0.5449 
(0.2006) 
0.5331 
(0.2414) 
0.1626 
(0.1555) 
0.1558 
(0.1570) 
0.3723 
(0.1924) 
0.3709 
(0.2352) 
87 
 
1997 
 
0.6795 
(0.2219) 
0.7086 
(0.2284) 
0.2166 
(0.2030) 
0.2327 
(0.2160) 
0.4519 
(0.2412) 
0.4644 
(0.2468) 
87 
 
1998 
 
0.7245 
(0.3163) 
0.7468 
(0.2488) 
0.1850 
(0.2161) 
0.1962 
(0.2364) 
0.5418 
(0.3641) 
0.5467 
(0.3071) 
87 
 
1999 
 
0.6788 
(0.3318) 
0.5871 
(0.2820) 
0.1777 
(0.2185) 
0.1689 
(0.2146) 
0.5060 
(0.3706) 
0.4239 
(0.2956) 
87 
 
Difference 
(90-97) 
0.2849a 
(0.2376) 
0.2887a 
(0.2789) 
0.1221a 
(0.2089) 
0.1260a 
(0.2249) 
0.1578a 
(0.2383) 
0.1593a 
(0.2674) 
 
        
a denotes significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix – Pooled Sample 
 
 
Variables LEV1B LEV1M LTDB LTDM STDB STDM TAN MTB SIZEA PROA 
LEV1B 1.000          
LEV1M .708a 1.000         
LTDB .357a .285a 1.000        
LTDM .296a .409a .899a 1.000       
STDB .751a .513a -.267a -.277a 1.000      
STDM .528a .739a -.286a -.216a .788a 1.000     
TAN .120a .140a .389a .404a -.144a -.138a 1.000    
MTB .022 -.505a -.030 -.202a .039 -.375a -.073b 1.000   
SIZEA .330a .240a .252a .265a .160a .064b .106a .118a 1.000  
PROA -.247a -.190a -.146a -.144a -.139a -.090a -.111a .109a .104a 1.000 
a denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
b denotes correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
 
Profitability: Pooled GLS results indicate a 
significant negative relation of profitability 
with book and market value of short-term 
ratios and total leverage ratios. Profitability 
seems to be the most dominant determinant of 
total leverage ratios and short-term debt ratios 
of Indonesian firms in the pooled GLS 
regressions as it generally has high beta 
coefficients and t-statistics that are statistically 
significant at 1% level. This study also finds 
that profitability has a positive relation to book 
and market value of long-term debt ratio. This 
positive relation seems contradict with the 
pecking order theory. We still suspect this 
positive relationship because it might have the 
correlation between the firm specific effect and 
profitability variable. This correlation might 
reverse the sign. It will discussed in the fixed 
GLS estimation result section. 
Fixed Effect GLS Estimation Result 
At the second stage of the analysis, this 
study will utilize the panel nature of the data 
set and employ fixed effects regression in 
order to control for underlying time-invariant 
heterogeneity among firms in the dataset. The 
failure to control effectively for time-invariant 
(but firm-specific) heterogeneity entails that 
the disturbance term in a classical linear 
regression will incorporate time-invariant 
omitted factors. Consequently, if these omitted 
factors are contemporaneously correlated with 
the included independent variables – as is the 
underlying assumption of the fixed effects 
model – parameter estimation will be biased 
and inconsistent. Hence, inference based upon 
these parameters estimation may lead to 
inappropriate conclusions (Hsiao [1986], 
Baltagi [1995]). By transforming the model to 
eliminate time-invariant (firm-variant) effects 
that vary by firm the parameters of the fixed 
effects model are BLUE under least square 
estimation. 
Comparison of the results presented in 
Table 3 panel A and B suggest that the 
explanatory power of regressions are higher 
under fixed effects GLS estimation than under 
pooled GLS estimation. Nevertheless, This 
study continues to be able to reject joint 
significance of the coefficients at less than the 
one percent level in all equations. Moreover, 
the computed Hausman statistics reject random 
effects in favor of fixed effects model. 
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Table 3. Summary of Multiple Regression Results 
  
Variables LEV1B LEV1M LTDB LTDM STDB STDM 
PANEL A: POOLED GLS MODEL 
TAN 
 
Tangibility 
 
0.130997a 
(0.023681) 
0.158168a 
(0.035266) 
0.020965a 
(0.003551) 
0.022139a 
(0.005206) 
0.042439b 
(0.013348) 
0.051915b 
(0.020705) 
MTB 
 
Growth 
opportunity 
-0.017970a 
(0.003691) 
-0.226743a 
(0.012891) 
-0.002698a 
(0.000454) 
-0.011687a 
(0.000427) 
0.008249b 
(0.003498) 
-0.125069a 
(0.009775) 
SIZEA 
 
Size 
 
0.121948a 
(0.004747) 
0.157489a 
(0.004963) 
0.000139 
(0.000551) 
0.004359a 
(0.000327) 
0.057034a 
(0.005633) 
0.084597a 
(0.005482) 
PROA 
 
Profitability 
 
-0.593397a 
(0.043143) 
-0.425723a 
(0.062583) 
0.016972a 
(0.002529) 
0.013907a 
(0.003392) 
-0.311751a 
(0.043803) 
-0.241472a 
(0.061163) 
AR (1) 
 
0.881299a 
(0.016756) 
0.777875a 
(0.021873) 
0.889901a 
(0.015024) 
0.834109a 
(0.020260) 
0.944699a 
(0.011295) 
0.902335a 
(0.017059) 
R2 0.926734 0.876731 0.683773 0.485921 0.862088 0.730033 
Adj. R2 0.926324 0.876042 0.682068 0.483149 0.861379 0.728645 
F-statistic 2260.978 1271.334 401.1034 175.3392 1215.820 525.9598 
F-prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NT 720 720 747 747 765 765 
 
PANEL B: FIXED EFFECT GLS MODEL 
TAN 
 
Tangibility 
 
0.1491a 
(0.02250) 
0.2021a 
(0.03152) 
0.0159a 
(0.00280) 
0.0209a 
(0.00637) 
0.0507a 
(0.00944) 
0.0811a 
(0.01627) 
MTB 
 
Growth 
opportunity 
-0.0197a 
(0.00352) 
-0.2298a 
(0.01369) 
-0.0038a 
(0.00050) 
-0.0127a 
(0.00074) 
0.0005 
(0.00360) 
-0.1230a 
(0.00923) 
SIZEA 
 
Size 
 
0.1323a 
(0.01709) 
0.1385a 
(0.01532) 
0.0110a 
(0.00262) 
0.0186a 
(0.00377) 
0.0337a 
(0.01298) 
0.0526a 
(0.01122) 
PROA 
 
Profitability 
 
-0.5234a 
(0.04479) 
-0.4606a 
(0.05480) 
-0.0073c 
(0.00376) 
-0.0152c 
(0.00688) 
-0.3265a 
(0.03520) 
-0.2712a 
(0.05530) 
AR (1) 
 
0.6556a 
(0.02785) 
0.4275a 
(0.03098) 
0.4923a 
(0.02642) 
0.3878a 
(0.03127) 
0.5938a 
(0.03432) 
0.4776a 
(0.03183) 
R2 0.9363 0.9208 0.7140 0.6860 0.8665 0.7958 
Adj. R2 0.9278 0.9103 0.6762 0.6445 0.8489 0.7689 
F-statistic 2332.655 1846.251 411.266 359.932 1095.188 657.691 
F-prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NT 720 720 747 747 765 765 
Hausman specification test for fixed versus random effect panel estimation 
2 188.0164 2701.721 425.5749 264.0968 133.3550 2049.464 
p-value 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
First line in each row of included independent variables represents t-statistics of the coefficients. Standard 
error is in parenthesis.  
a denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
b denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
c denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Tangibility: This study did not find the 
influence of tangibility on the level of the 
leverage measures to reverse sign when using 
fixed effects GLS rather than pooled GLS. It is 
only find changes in the magnitude influence 
of tangibility on the leverage measure. 
Furthermore, the significance of the influence 
of tangibility on short-term debt ratio is 
increase under fixed effects GLS regression. 
The positive sign of tangibility coefficient in 
all leverage equations suggesting that collateral 
is not only correlated with the level of long-
term debt, but is also a determining factor in 
obtaining short-term debt finance. It means 
that lenders condition their lending – whether 
long-term or short-term debt – on the 
availability of collateral value. The positive 
tangibility coefficient for short-term debt ratios 
contradicts the maturity principle. However, 
the results may be time-specific, with lenders 
having become increasingly cautious in their 
lending policies following the Indonesian 
economic crisis of the mid 1997. We turn to 
this point in the Dynamics in Fixed Effects 
Estimation section below.  
Growth opportunity: The result show that 
growth opportunity has a significant negative 
influence on the level of total leverage (both 
LEV1B and LEV1M), and on the level of 
long-term debt (both LTDB and LTDM). 
Comparing the coefficients of the pooled GLS 
and the fixed effects GLS model illustrates that 
controlling for underlying firm-variant 
heterogeneity in the sample has a significant 
impact on the results. This study finds that 
previous positive correlation between growth 
opportunity and STDB become insignificant 
under fixed effects GLS regression. Therefore, 
controlling for time-invariant (firm-variant) 
heterogeneity eliminates the influence of 
growth opportunity upon STDB. 
Consequently, the hypothesis of positive 
relationship between growth opportunity and 
short-term debt is rejected, but for different 
reasons than previously. 
Size: The influence of company size on 
each of the leverage measures does not change 
substantially under the two different estimation 
techniques, although there are some slight 
changes in the magnitude and the significance 
of the coefficient. The missing variable bias of 
pooled GLS model appears to have some 
influence on the estimation of relationship 
between size and LTDB. Once time-invariant 
heterogeneity is controlled for, the influence of 
size on LTDB is positive but insignificant 
under pooled GLS model becomes significant 
under fixed effect GLS model. Controlling for 
firm specific effects, it is found a positive 
relationship between size and all leverage 
measures. 
Profitability: After controlling for time-
invariant heterogeneity leads to significant 
changes in magnitude and the statistically 
significance of the regression coefficients 
generally (most notably in the case of LTDB, 
LTDM and STDM), polarity remains constant 
save for LEV1B and LEV1M. It is observed 
that the influence of profitability on long-term 
debt reverse sign, from positive under pooled 
GLS model become negative under fixed effect 
GLS model. The statistically significance of 
negative influence of profitability on LTDB 
and LTDM are slightly change, from 1% level 
of significance under pooled GLS model 
become 10% level of significance under fixed-
effects GLS model. These suggest that this 
study still found a negative relationship 
between profitability and all leverage 
measures, thus this study still able to accept the 
pecking-order explanation for all leverage 
measure. 
The result of this section illustrate that 
controlling for underlying time-invariant 
heterogeneity through estimating a fixed 
effects GLS model change several of the 
results that were obtained under pooled GLS 
model. However, control for time-variant 
heterogeneity, whether there are any dynamic 
factors that affect all firms generally, are not 
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established yet. We will turn to this in the 
below section 
The Dynamics in Fixed Effects GLS 
Estimations 
 In this section, time-variant heterogeneity 
is controlled to take into account all possible 
dynamics in influence of included variables 
through periods. One possible method to do 
this would be to use variable intercept and 
slope model (Bevan and Danbold [2001]). This 
approach effectively assumes that the time 
effects can be captured by shifts in both 
intercept and slopes regression. We follow the 
work of Bevan and Danbold [2001] extended 
the fixed effect model by introducing time 
dummy variables for two periods (before and 
during crisis) and its interaction with included 
independent variables. By doing this allow us 
not only test for general time-specific (but 
firm-invariant) shifts in leverage level, but also 
to determine whether the influence of included 
independent variables on leverage level 
changes through time. The results of the 
regressions are presented in Table 4. 
From table 4, the coefficient of dummy 
crisis period is significant at the 1% level of 
significance. The coefficient of dummy crisis 
period may be interpreted as the deviation of 
leverage level during crisis period from the 
level of leverage before crisis period. It is 
observed that the coefficients of dummy crisis 
period are positive significant in LEV1B, 
LEV1M, STDB, and STDM equations, and 
negative significant in LTDB and LTDM. 
These mean that Indonesian firms used more 
debt in their capital structure and more short-
term debt in crisis period (partly the increase 
may be due to exchange rate swings). Even so, 
this study found a significant negative 
coefficient of dummy crisis period, indicating 
that Indonesian firms start to reduce their long 
term-debt level in their capital structure at 
early crisis period. The result also supports the 
World Bank report that Indonesian firms are 
highly relied on debt (especially on external 
debt) and with shorter debt maturity, and the 
crisis hurt them more.  
A superficial glance at table 4 reveals a 
large number of significant time interaction 
coefficients, suggesting some degree of 
dynamic dependence among the coefficients. 
This is confirmed when we note that overall 
adjusted R
2
 measure for this set regressions is 
typically larger than under fixed effects 
estimation without time interactions. Even so, 
this study also observes a decline in the 
associated F-statistic indicating that the loss of 
degree of freedom is not offset with increased 
explanatory power. However, the results of 
Wald coefficient test for joint insignificance of 
the interactive time dummies, presented in 
table 4, rejects of joint insignificance. 
Tangibility: The introduction of dummy 
crisis period has limited the impact of several 
included independent variables on leverage 
level. The influence of tangibility on LEV1B 
and LEV1M before crisis period does not 
change significantly during crisis period. The 
coefficients of tangibility on STDB and STDM 
equations before crisis period are 0.1395 and 
0.1609 respectively, becomes 0.0690 and 
0.0119 during crisis period.2 This means that 
there was declining in magnitude influence of 
tangibility on short-term debt during crisis 
period. However, this study observes the 
influence of tangibility on long-term debt is 
positive insignificant in before crisis period, 
become positive and significant during crisis 
period.  
 
                                                 
2  The coefficient of tangibility in crisis period is 
computed as sum of TAN and TANA. 
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Table 4. Summary of The Regression Results for Dynamics in Fixed Effect Model 
 
 
FIXED EFFECT GLS MODEL WITH DUMMY VARIABLE AND ITS INTERACTION WITH 
INCLUDED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variables LEV1B LEV1M LTDB LTDM STDB STDM 
DUMTHA 
 
Dummy crisis period 
 
0.4440a 
(0.07218) 
0.3710a 
(0.05894) 
-0.0099 
(0.00881) 
-0.0514a 
(0.01099) 
0.2749a 
(0.04523) 
0.4299a 
(0.06202) 
TAN 
 
Tangibility 
 
0.1852a 
(0.02245) 
0.2355a 
(0.02919) 
0.0110 
(0.01236) 
0.0087 
(0.00643) 
0.1395a 
(0.01565) 
0.1609a 
(0.02047) 
TANA 
 
Tangibility * DUMTHA 
 
-0.0272 
(0.03747) 
-0.0335 
(0.034201) 
0.0195b 
(0.00782) 
0.0265a 
(0.00983) 
-0.0705b 
(0.03246) 
-0.1490a 
(0.03435) 
MTB 
 
Growth opportunity 
 
-0.0163a 
(0.00348) 
-0.2298a 
(0.01454) 
-0.0024a 
(0.00069) 
-0.0119a 
(0.00082) 
0.0017 
(0.003738) 
-0.1187a 
(0.01065) 
MTBA 
 
Growth opportunity * 
DUMTHA 
-0.0138 
(0.00852) 
-0.0204 
(0.01856) 
-0.0020b 
(0.00101) 
-0.0052a 
(0.00127) 
0.0003 
(0.00614) 
-0.0182 
(0.01382) 
SIZEA 
 
Size 
 
0.1248a 
(0.01492) 
0.0774a 
(0.01507) 
0.0144a 
(0.00319) 
0.0083a 
(0.00386) 
0.0315b 
(0.01458) 
0.0391a 
(0.01461) 
SIZEAA 
 
Size *DUMTHA 
 
-0.0554a 
(0.01285) 
-0.0323a 
(0.00864) 
0.0017 
(0.00172) 
0.0106a 
(0.00228) 
-0.0320a 
(0.00857) 
-0.0471a 
(0.01036) 
PROA 
 
Profitability 
 
-0.3183a 
(0.06483) 
-0.1365c 
(0.07909) 
-0.0448a 
(0.00675) 
-0.0274a 
(0.00952) 
-0.0554 
(0.04414) 
-0.0479 
(0.073596) 
PROAA 
 
Profitability * 
DUMTHA 
-0.1129 
(0.08254) 
-0.2926a 
(0.08815) 
-0.0447a 
(0.00732) 
-0.0277a 
(0.010576) 
-0.3790a 
(0.05035) 
-0.3100a 
(0.09033) 
AR (1) 
 
0.5972a 
(0.02925) 
0.3886a 
(0.03014) 
0.4590a 
(0.02916) 
0.3733a 
(0.03164) 
0.5422a 
(0.03504) 
0.4214a 
(0.033329) 
R2 0.9399 0.9291 0.6862 0.6257 0.9029 0.8430 
Adj. R2 0.9313 0.9190 0.6421 0.5732 0.8891 0.8206 
F-statistic 1171.070 978.733 162.763 116.251 696.714 401.997 
F-prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NT 771 769 765 765 771 771 
Hausman specification test for fixed versus random effect panel estimation 
2 370.73878 3987.8019 312.62609 290.78721 151.97915 103.08882 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wald coefficient test for joint significance of time interaction variables 
F-statistic 37.30495 7.360731 29.31303 5.760971 46.16952 14.42020 
Probability 0.000000 0.000008 0.000000 0.000144 0.000000 0.000000 
Chi-square 149.2198 29.44292 117.2521 23.04389 184.6781 57.68081 
Probability 0.000000 0.000006 0.000000 0.000124 0.000000 0.000000 
First line in each row of included independent variables represents t-statistics of the coefficients. Standard 
error is in parenthesis.  
a denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
b denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
c denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Growth opportunity: Comparison of the 
result in table 3 and 4 reveals that controlling 
for the time dimension in the fixed effects 
analysis have a little significant impact on the 
results regarding the relationship between 
leverage ratios and the growth opportunity 
(MTB). Previous results found that total 
leverage (LEV1B and LEV1M), long-term 
debt (LTDB and LTDM), and in particular 
STDM, were negatively correlated with the 
level of growth opportunities, while the impact 
of growth opportunity on STDB was positive 
but insignificant. Controlling for time only 
makes slightly changes in the magnitude of the 
growth opportunity coefficients before crisis 
period. However, during the crisis period, the 
coefficient of interaction variable between 
dummy and growth opportunity is negatively 
significant only for long-term debt. 
Size: Table 3 panel A and B illustrated that 
generally, large firms tend to use more long-
term debt and short-term debt than smaller 
firms. This study then tries to find out whether 
this relationship remains constant through 
periods. By controlling for time-variant 
heterogeneity does make shift in the magnitude 
influence of size on the leverage measures. The 
influence size on short-term debt during crisis 
period has declined; even the coefficient of 
size becomes negative.3 This illustrates that the 
correlation between size and short-term debt 
may have weakened through time. This may 
suggest that during crisis period large 
companies tend to reduce their short-term debt, 
and or lenders have become more willing to 
lend short-term debt to small firms.  
Profitability: The result illustrated that 
controlling for time has a significant effect 
upon the correlation between profitability and 
short-term debt. The only caveat is being loss 
significance of profitability coefficients on 
STDB and STDM equations relative to the 
                                                 
3  The coefficients of size in STDB and STDM equations 
during crisis period are –0.0005 and –0.0080 
respectively.  
previous fixed effect estimation. The 
interactive dummy coefficients on profitability 
in short-term debt equations is negatively 
significant, point up that during the crisis 
period profitable firms appear to have 
decreased their short-term debt. Furthermore, 
the interactive dummy coefficients on 
profitability in long-term debt equations is 
negatively significant provide more support 
toward the pecking order theory.  
The Influence of Industry Characteristics 
on Capital Structure 
The industrial dummy variables are 
introduced into the pooled GLS model to find 
out the influence of industrial characteristics 
on capital structure. These industrial dummies 
replace the individual firm dummies vector in 
fixed effect model, and save degree of freedom 
in estimation.  
The results in table 5 provide evidence that 
industrial characteristics have a significant role 
in explaining the Indonesian firms leverage 
level. However, Wald test provide stronger 
evidence that the industrial dummies have 
significant impact on all leverage measures. 
Thus, inter-industry differences of debt ratios 
or leverage ratios and their correlation with 
firm characteristics provide evidence against 
the random distribution of firms’ debt ratios in 
the Miller’s irrelevant theory.  
The evidence on the significant influence 
of industrial dummies was contradicted with 
the result of capital structure study conducted 
by Purba (2001). She found that industrial 
classification does not have significant 
influence on Indonesian firms capital structure 
(total debt-to-total assets ratio) for both before 
crisis period and during crisis period.  
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Table 5. Summary of Regression Result of Capital Structure Determinants and Industrial dummies 
on capital structure.  
 
Variables LEV1B LEV1M LTDB LTDM STDB STDM 
* Common intercept - - - - - - 
TAN Tangibility 0.1684a 
(0.023824) 
0.1723a 
(0.031817) 
0.0484a 
(0.004891) 
0.0454a 
(0.003927) 
0.0534a 
(0.014541) 
0.0326 
(0.022772) 
MTB Growth 
opportunity 
-0.0143a 
(0.004893) 
-0.2365a 
(0.011730) 
-0.00413a 
(0.000528) 
-0.0125a 
(0.000349) 
0.0092a 
(0.003528) 
-0.1300a 
(0.009467) 
SIZEA Size  0.0857a 
(0.017047) 
0.0530a 
(0.010632) 
0.0129a 
(0.002761) 
0.0050b 
(0.002167) 
-0.0099 
(0.020561) 
-0.0118 
(0.018715) 
PROA Profitability -0.4318a 
(0.055431) 
-0.3504a 
(0.056800) 
-0.0023 
(0.003800) 
-0.0044 
(0.003486) 
-0.2486a 
(0.047635) 
-0.1792a 
(0.065199) 
DUMTHA Dummy years 
after crisis 
0.0847a 
(0.008576) 
0.1244a 
(0.009447) 
-0.0010 
(0.000649) 
-0.0022a 
(0.000498) 
0.0244a 
(0.007283) 
0.0496a 
(0.009901) 
1 Industry 1 0.2295 
(0.139504) 
0.5651a 
(0.098563) 
-0.0517a 
(0.015201) 
0.0040 
(0.009948) 
0.7709 
(0.746276) 
0.6832c 
(0.397764) 
2 Industry 2 0.0267 
(0.105249) 
0.4445a 
(0.069164) 
-0.0766a 
(0.015260) 
-0.0169 
(0.010685) 
0.3418b 
(0.137799) 
0.4723a 
(0.121101) 
3 Industry 3 0.1224 
(0.104191) 
0.5306a 
(0.071714) 
-0.0759a 
(0.017265) 
-0.0065 
(0.012202) 
0.6369a 
(0.144959) 
0.6869a 
(0.113637) 
4 Industry 4 0.0310 
(0.105134) 
0.5520a 
(0.063894) 
-0.0435b 
(0.018031) 
0.0318b 
(0.013653) 
0.4712a 
(0.141539) 
0.7069a 
(0.118368) 
5 Industry 5 0.4358a 
(0.143189) 
0.6476a 
(0.066292) 
0.3184a 
(0.105960) 
0.3338a 
(0.086786) 
0.4926b 
(0.191725) 
0.4111a 
(0.108019) 
6 Industry 6 0.0526 
(0.147668) 
0.3494a 
(0.095182) 
0.4065b 
(0.178010) 
0.1381 
(0.130158) 
0.0933 
(0.149501) 
0.2358b 
(0.112863) 
7 Industry 7 0.2718b 
(0.117554) 
0.5509a 
(0.067458) 
-0.0552a 
(0.015020) 
0.0023 
(0.010811) 
0.2048b 
(0.103488) 
0.5275Ba 
(0.113841) 
AR(1) 
 
0.8759a 
(0.018393) 
0.7120a 
(0.025319) 
0.8556a 
(0.017133) 
0.8054 
(0.020861) 
0.9247a 
(0.015627) 
0.8457a 
(0.020410) 
R2 0.9156 0.9123 0.6666 0.651902 0.8573 0.7291 
Adj. R2 0.9142 0.9108 0.6612 0.643858 0.8550 0.7248 
F-statistic 639.1759 612.5045 122.3060 162.3896 385.3481 172.6697 
F-prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
NT 720 720 747 747 783 783 
Wald coefficient test for industrial dummy 
F-statistic 3.340604 138.7749 13.47162 16.81073 7.570814 15.63985 
Prob. 0.001631 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
2 23.38423 971.4246 94.30133 117.6751 52.99570 109.4790 
Prob.  0.001461 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
First line in each row of included independent variables represents t-statistics of the coefficients. Standard 
error is in parenthesis.  
a denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
b denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
c denotes coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
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CONCLUSION 
JSX firms employ relatively high debt in 
their capital structure, around 53%, 15%, and 
38% for total debt, long-term debt, and short-
term debt respectively. We observed that these 
ratios increase during the crisis period. 
Indonesian economy faced a downturn since 
1997. At the beginning of 1997s, Indonesian 
firms faced the decreased in their equity 
values, and increase the debt values due to 
exchange rate swing. 
As regard the determinants of capital 
structure of JSX firms, the results from pooled 
GLS model show that tangibility and size of 
the firm variables has a significant positive 
influence on all leverage measures, 
profitability variable have a significant 
negative relationship with all leverage measure 
except for long-term debt ratios, growth 
opportunity has a negative relationship with all 
leverage measure except for STDB. This study 
found that growth opportunity has a significant 
positive relationship with STDB. 
This study then tries to find out whether 
these relationships remain constant after 
controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity. 
Controlling time-invariant heterogeneity, there 
are found some changes in the result. It is 
observed that profitability coefficient in LTDB 
and LTDM equations reverse sign from 
positive under pooled GLS model becomes 
negative under fixed effect GLS model. 
In order to additionally control for time-
variant factors that affect all firms generally, 
the analysis is extended by introducing dummy 
period and its interaction with included 
independent variables. It is found that there are 
dynamics in the data. It is observed that the 
magnitude influence of included variables 
change after controlling for time-variant 
factors.  
At general level, by controlling for time-
variant factors, it is found that during the crisis 
period companies in the sample have made 
increasing use of total debt, less use of long 
term debt, and increasing use of short-term 
debt. These results revealed that exchange rate 
fall have caused the market capitalization of 
their equities fell, the total leverage ratio and 
the short-term debt increased, but the long-
term debt decreased. However, this general 
result was found to differ between firms 
according to the four determining factors. First, 
over before crisis period, JSX companies with 
high tangible assets have tended to use more 
short-term debt and total debt. During crisis 
period, these companies have tended to 
decrease the use of short-term in favor to long-
term debt.  
Secondly, before crisis period high growth 
opportunity companies have tended to employ 
less total debt and long-term debt. However, 
over crisis period these companies have tended 
to decrease the use of long-term debt.  
Third, large companies have tended to 
employ more debt (both long-term and short-
term debt) before crisis period. Over crisis 
period, they have tended to reduce the level of 
their debt, particularly short-term debt then 
before crisis period. There are two possible 
reasons for these phenomena: (1) large 
companies have accelerated their debt payment 
due to exchange rate volatility, or (2) lenders 
have started to shift their loan orientation, from 
for large companies before crisis period to for 
small and medium scale companies during 
crisis period. Furthermore, they have used 
more long-term debt then before crisis period, 
probably they have rolled over their debt, or 
have made debt restructuring.  
Fourth, profitable firms have used less 
debt, mainly less long-term debt before crisis 
period. These continue over crisis period, and 
suggest that this study still can support pecking 
order theory of negative relationship between 
debt level and profitability for both before 
crisis and during crisis period. 
As regard to the influence of industrial 
characteristic on capital structure, the result 
from the pooled GLS model with industrial 
dummies show that there are inter-industry 
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differences of debt ratios or leverage ratios and 
their correlation with firm characteristics. 
These evidence against the random distribution 
of Miller’s debt irrelevance theory. 
We suggest that further research ers make a 
deeper investigation on the influence of 
Indonesian financial market development to 
firms’ capital structure. For example, the 
influence of capital market, bond market, and 
banking sector development, both in their sizes 
and activities, as sources of fund or supply 
side, on firms’ capital structure choices. 
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